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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we decide that the defendant lawyers' 
decision to invoke federal case law, rather than a 
procedural rule, in persuading a district judge to issue a 
maritime attachment does not give rise to a cause of action 
for malicious abuse of civil process under state law. The 
lawyers did not act in bad faith because they disclosed the 
existence of the alternative courses to the Court. We also 
conclude that the conflict between the procedural rule and 
the opinion of a United States Court of Appeals raises a 
federal question sufficient to support removal of the 
malicious abuse of process claim from the state court to the 
federal forum. We will affirm the District Court's judgment 
in favor of the defendants. 
 
Plaintiff U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. ("Express Lines") is a 
Pennsylvania corporation that chartered vessels from 
various shipowners to carry cargo for its customers. The 
company maintained its principal place of business in 
Paoli, Pennsylvania, within the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. 
 
Express Lines had arranged financing through a line of 
credit from Founders Bank, secured by certificates of 
deposit purchased by the individual plaintiffs. When the 
company encountered cash flow problems in 1997, it began 
negotiating for further financial support from other 
institutions. In January 1998, it advised its creditors, 
including the defendant vessel owners, of the encouraging 
progress of its efforts. 
 
Nevertheless, on February 11, 1998, one of the vessel 
owners, through its counsel, defendant Ann-Michele 
Higgins of defendant law firm Rawle & Henderson, applied 
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania for the attachment of "all assets, goods, 
and chattels, belonging to" Express Lines. In seeking the 
attachments, the defendant attorneys cited as governing 
law an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
 
                                3 
  
Circuit, rather than the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty 
Claims. On February 17, 1998, the District Court ordered 
that the certificates of deposit at Founders Bank be 
attached. 
 
Other creditor vessel owners took similar action through 
their attorneys, defendants A. Robert Degen and the law 
firm of Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien, & Frankel, Ltd., Laurence 
Shtasel and Jeffrey S. Moller, both of defendant Blank 
Rome Comisky & McCauley, and Harry G. Mahoney and 
Thomas C. Sullivan, of the defendant law firm Deasey, 
Mahoney, & Bender, Ltd. As a result of these legal actions, 
Express Lines defaulted on its loan agreements and was 
forced to suspend and eventually cease its commercial 
operations. 
 
The District Court vacated the attachments on November 
5, 1998, concluding that its decision to depart from the 
restrictions imposed by Rule B of the Supplemental Rules 
for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure ("Supplemental Rule B") was in 
error. The Court then directed the parties to arbitration in 
accordance with the terms of the charter party, ordered 
that the assets that Founders Bank had deposited in an 
interpleader action remain in the Court's custody, and 
retained jurisdiction pending arbitration. 
 
On January 28, 1999, Express Lines and the individual 
owners of the certificates of deposit at Founders Bank filed 
suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, 
Pennsylvania, against the vessel owners and their various 
counsel. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive 
damages for abuse of process, conspiracy, wrongful use of 
civil proceedings, and other torts. 
 
Plaintiffs contend that defendants secured the writs of 
attachment in direct violation of Rule B, which precludes 
the seizure of maritime assets if the debtor is found within 
the district in which the litigation is commenced. They 
assert that defendants were well aware that Express Lines 
kept its principal office in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and thus, they acted in bad faith in seeking 
attachments in that district. 
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The defendant vessel owners were never served with 
process, and the claims against them were ultimately  
dismissed.1 The lawyer defendants removed the case to the 
District Court, and the plaintiffs moved to remand. The 
District Court refused, concluding that, based as it was on 
the issuance of maritime attachments, "[t]he federal 
element [of the litigation] cuts to the heart of each of 
Plaintiffs' claims" and, therefore, federal question 
jurisdiction existed. 
 
The District Court dismissed the case under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that the defendant 
lawyers' actions were privileged because they had not 
misled the Court as to the underlying facts or relevant law 
in obtaining the attachment. The Court added that there 
had been no abuse of process in the defendants' use of 
maritime attachments to collect debts whose legitimacy 
plaintiffs did not contest. Because the writs had been 
issued with court authorization, the defendants had not 
acted in a grossly negligent manner or without probable 
cause. Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiffs had 
failed to establish their state law claims. 
 
In this appeal, plaintiffs contend that the defendant 
attorneys misled the Court in securing the attachments, 
and that the efforts to obtain them were made in bad faith 
because the charter party required that disputes be 
arbitrated. The plaintiffs also assert that the District Court 
erred in declining to remand the case to the state court. 
 
The defendants deny that they engaged in any deception 
and argue that the state law claims fail as a matter of law. 
Alternatively, they contend that because the challenged 
activity occurred in a federal court, no state cause of action 
may be applied to their conduct. Finally, defendants assert 
that because of an omission in the plaintiffs' notice of 
appeal, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction. 
 
We exercise plenary review of the District Court's 
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The plaintiffs have not contested the dismissal of the defendant 
shipowners and have treated this case as directed solely against the 
lawyers. We will do likewise. 
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Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 
1261 (3d Cir. 1994). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, courts accept as true the allegations in the 
complaint and its attachments, as well as reasonable 
inferences construed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs. Id. Although a district court may not consider 
matters extraneous to the pleadings, "a document integral 
to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be 
considered without converting the motion to dismiss into 
one for summary judgment." In re Burlington Coat Factory 
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. 
White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192 (3d Cir. 1993) (matters 
of public record). 
 
We review de novo a district court's denial of remand. 
Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 143 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993); 
see also Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295, 298 
(5th Cir. 1999). 
 
I. 
 
We first address jurisdictional issues. The plaintiffs' 
complaint alleges violations of state law. Because the 
parties are not diverse, our jurisdiction, as well as that of 
the District Court, must rest upon the existence of a federal 
question. 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1441(b). 
 
At the outset, we address an error in the defendants' 
brief that cites Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964 (3d 
Cir. 1992), as dispositive of our appellate jurisdiction. 
Lusardi holds that, with certain exceptions not pertinent 
here, an appeal taken from a specified judgment or part of 
a specified judgment does not confer upon the court of 
appeals jurisdiction to review other judgments or portions 
not specified or inferred from the notice of appeal. 975 F.2d 
at 971-72. 
 
Defendants contend that because plaintiffs did not 
designate the order denying remand in their notice of 
appeal, we do not have authority to review that issue. This 
argument is oblivious to the duty of federal courts to 
examine their subject matter jurisdiction at all stages of the 
litigation sua sponte if the parties fail to raise the issue. 
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That obligation extends to removal cases, as well as to 
those originally filed in the district courts. Meritcare Inc. v. 
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of 
Phila., 657 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1981). Clearly, Lusardi is 
inapposite to the removal jurisdiction issue in this case. 
 
Any civil action brought in state court may be removed 
by the defendant to the federal district court in the district 
where such action is pending, if the district court would 
have original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. 
S 1441(a); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers 
Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983). Where the 
parties are not diverse, removal is appropriate only if the 
case falls within the district court's original"federal 
question" jurisdiction: "all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 
U.S.C. SS 1331, 1441(b); Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8. 
 
In determining whether a case arises under federal law, 
courts are instructed to look to the plaintiff 's"well-pleaded 
complaint." Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 
804, 808 (1986). It is not enough that a federal question is 
or may be raised as a defense. Id.; Trent Realty, 657 F.2d 
at 33. "[T]he controversy must be disclosed upon the face of 
the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for 
removal." Westmoreland Hosp. Ass'n v. Blue Cross of W. 
Pa., 605 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Gully v. First 
Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936)). 
Attachments to the complaint are considered part of it. 
 
The state suit need not invoke a federal law in order to 
"arise under" it for removal purposes. It is sufficient that 
the merits of the litigation turn on a substantial federal 
issue that is "an element, and an essential one, of the 
plaintiff 's cause of action." Gully, 299 U.S. at 112. The 
controversy must be "genuine and present . . . not merely 
. . . conjectural." Id. at 113. In short, the federal law "must 
be in the forefront of the case and not collateral, peripheral, 
or remote." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813 n.11; see also 
United Jersey Banks v. Parell, 783 F.2d 360, 367 (3d Cir. 
1986) (no federal question existed because right to relief 
under state law did not require resolution of a substantial 
question of federal law). It need not, however, be a situation 
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in which federal law completely preempts state law. See 
Goepel v. Nat'l Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (discussing "complete preemption" doctrine). 
 
The case before us does not involve the "artful pleading" 
doctrine, which requires a court to peer through what are 
ostensibly wholly state claims to discern the federal 
question lurking in the verbiage. See, e.g., United Jersey 
Banks, 783 F.2d at 367. The complaint filed in the state 
court is quite detailed and is augmented by numerous 
documents, such as the motions for attachment, the 
charter party, and the order attaching Express Lines' 
assets. The complaint and the documents affixed to it 
charge the defendants with malicious abuse of process in 
causing the District Court to override Rule B's restrictions 
in erroneous reliance on a Court of Appeals opinion. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the mere fact that the property 
attachments were granted pursuant to maritime law is an 
inadequate basis for removal. They point out that under the 
saving to suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. S 1333(1), federal and 
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in maritime 
matters. See Supplemental Rule B(1); Romero v. Int'l 
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); In re Dutile, 
935 F.2d 61, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1991); Furness Withy 
(Chartering), Inc., Panama v. World Energy Sys. Assocs., 
Inc., 854 F.2d 410, 411 n.1 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 
The saving to suitors clause "preserves alternatives of 
suing on the `law side' of the federal court or in state court, 
with admiralty and maritime law applied to the claim." 
George K. Walker, Supplemental, Pendent & Ancillary 
Jurisdiction in Admiralty and Maritime Cases: The ALI 
Federal Judicial Code Revision Project and Admiralty 
Practice, 32 J. Mar. L. & Com. 567, 568 (2001); see also id. 
at 568 n.8 (listing cases); Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, 
Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 444-45 (2001) (explaining that saving to 
suitors clause preserves concurrent jurisdiction of state 
courts over some admiralty and maritime claims); 14A 
Charles A. Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. S 3672, at 301- 
05 (3d ed. 1998). The plaintiffs' argument would carry 
weight if their state cause of action were a maritime one. 
But it is not; it is a claim for malicious use of process, a 
state tort not confined to admiralty. 
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The Supreme Court, construing federal question 
jurisdiction in the removal context, has held that admiralty 
cases do not fall within the scope of 28 U.S.C.S 1441, 
which designates as appropriate for removal only those 
cases "arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of 
the United States." Romero, 358 U.S. at 368-69. Thus, an 
admiralty case filed in state court may only be removed if 
there exists some independent basis for federal jurisdiction, 
such as diversity of citizenship. Id. at 380-381. We need not 
here discuss the logic or reasoning of Romero , which has 
spawned more than its share of commentary.2 It is enough 
for us to recognize its existence, because we conclude that 
it is not applicable. 
 
As we have noted, the removed case is not an admiralty 
action but one involving state tort law. Moreover, the 
federal question at the heart of this litigation is the 
applicability and construction of Supplemental Rule B. 
Although the Rule sets out procedures to be followed in 
maritime attachments, it is in fact part of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, adopted under the authority of the Rules 
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2072. 
 
The Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 
which took effect in 1920, were rescinded as of July 1, 
1966. At that time, admiralty rules were merged into the 
Rules of Civil Procedure. This consolidation was similar to 
that which abolished the distinction between law and 
equity. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Engerrand, Removal and Remand of Admiralty 
Suits, 21 Tul. Mar. L.J. 383, 385 (1997) (discussing removal of admiralty 
cases and stating that "[d]espite the fact that the `congressional 
language 
. . . is perfectly understandable in ordinary English,' the determination 
whether admiralty cases can be removed has been affected by historical 
accident rather than traditional principles of statutory interpretation;" 
id. 
at 386-90 (explaining Romero's effect on federal question jurisdiction in 
admiralty claims); George Rutherglen, The Federal Rules for Admiralty 
and Maritime Cases: A Verdict of Quiescent Years, 27 J. Mar. L. & Com. 
581, 590-92 (1996) (discussing complexities in saving to suitors clause 
actions resulting from Romero); David J. Sharpe, The Future of Maritime 
Law in the Federal Courts: A Faculty Colloquium, 31 J. Mar. L. & Com. 
217, 232-34 (2000) (recognizing the confusion as to removal in 
admiralty). 
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Since 1966, admiralty procedure has therefore been 
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. All rules 
governing these procedures are recommended by the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and adopted in 
accordance with the conventions of the Rules Enabling Act. 
Although Rule B delineates procedures that are particularly 
applicable to the unique features of maritime attachments, 
it is nonetheless an integral part of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
 
It is noteworthy that Romero was decided in 1959, prior 
to the consolidation of the admiralty and civil rules. Thus, 
any effect that Romero might have had on the construction 
of rules of admiralty procedure was abrogated by that 
consolidation. Support for this position is found in the 
language of the Rules Enabling Act itself, which provides 
that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no 
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." 28 
U.S.C. S 2072(b); see Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 
654 (1996) (holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 superseded 
service provision in the Suits in Admiralty Act). 
 
At the heart of each of the plaintiffs' state law claims is 
the assertion that the defendants acted in bad faith by 
urging the District Court to disregard a federal rule of 
procedure, which would have barred the attachments, and 
to rely instead on case law, which permitted the seizures. 
The plaintiffs have thus alleged a substantial question of 
federal law involving an apparent clash between a 
procedural rule and a contrary holding by a United States 
Court of Appeals.3 Moreover, this conflict arises in the area 
of maritime attachments, a subject of particular concern to 
the federal courts, and one where national uniformity is of 
some importance. See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. 
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 209-11 (1996) (discussing various 
contexts in which "vindication of maritime policies 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. That the federal question was an essential, and ultimately dispositive, 
element is demonstrated by the fact that were we to decide that 
Leonhardt, discussed infra, was the correct statement of the law, the 
plaintiffs' case could be dismissed on that basis alone. Moreover, 
Express Lines sustained its injury at the time the attachments were 
served and the assets seized. The District Court's decision vacating the 
attachments came too late to save the company. 
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demanded uniform adherence to a federal rule of decision, 
with no leeway for variation or supplementation by state 
law."). Although not determinative, it is worth noting that 
this case also implicates the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 
U.S.C. S 1 et seq. 
 
Fundamentally, the plaintiffs argue that the Eleventh 
Circuit opinion is incorrect, and it is that allegedly 
erroneous interpretation of federal law upon which their 
state claim depends. Where a plaintiff 's complaint requires 
the juxtaposition of a court of appeals decision and an 
apparently conflicting procedural rule, the federal courts 
may properly claim jurisdiction. This is particularly so 
where, as here, the decision in controversy has not been 
overruled or reversed. The Eleventh Circuit opinion is a 
carefully reasoned exposition, concluding that Rule B does 
not limit admiralty's historic jurisdiction. The Court did not 
overlook Rule B, but analyzed it and found that its 
restrictions did not apply. 
 
We are persuaded that in the unique circumstances here, 
the federal issue set forth in the complaint is an essential 
element of the plaintiffs' cause of action. Accordingly, the 
case was properly removed and the District Court did not 
err in denying the motion to remand. 
 
II. 
 
Having resolved the jurisdictional issue, we now consider 
the federal and pendent state claims on the merits. We 
invoke our discretion in choosing to first consider the 
federal defenses to the state suit. 
 
The fact that a federal question permits removal does not 
go so far as to support the defendants' contention that 
preemption applies. They argue that because the events 
complained of occurred in a federal court, the state claims 
are superseded and the plaintiffs are limited to the relief 
afforded by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 28 U.S.C. 
S 1927, and the inherent powers of a court as explicated in 
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). 
 
Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs disagree. They rely on 
Pennsylvania's Dragonetti Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A.S 8351 et seq., 
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and common law, both of which provide a cause of action 
for the wrongful use of civil proceedings. The Act 
establishes liability when "[a] person who takes part in the 
procurement, initiation or continuation of civil proceedings 
against another" acts "in a grossly negligent manner" or 
without probable cause and primarily for an improper 
purpose. Id. S 8351(a). A plaintiff may recover under the Act 
for harm resulting from interference with the advantageous 
use of land, chattels or other things, and other expenses 
which include reasonable attorneys' fees, harm to 
reputation, specific pecuniary loss resulting from the 
proceedings, emotional distress, and punitive damages. Id. 
S 8353. 
 
The recovery under Dragonetti can be more expansive 
than the sanctions available under Rule 11, which are 
generally limited to counsel fees or fines, or counsel fees 
alone under 28 U.S.C. S 1927. Even assessments made 
under the inherent power of the courts have not been held 
to cover such matters as consequential damages, loss to 
reputation, or emotional distress.4 
 
The breadth of the remedy provided by the state statute 
is a strong indication of its substantive nature. Under the 
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2072(b), procedural rules 
may not supplant substantive rights but the line between 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The damages that might be awarded for wrongful attachment have not 
been fully explored. Neither party has raised or briefed the preemption 
aspect in this context. A brief examination of the case law indicates that 
damages in this area, if awarded at all, generally consist of attorneys' 
fees, costs, and expenses "directly" attributable to the attachment. See 
Furness Withy (Chartering), Inc., Panama v. World Energy Sys. Assocs., 
Inc., 772 F.2d 802 (11th Cir. 1985) (no bad faith, therefore no damages 
awarded); Ocean Ship Supply, Ltd. v. MV Leah, 729 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 
1984) (same); Frontera Fruit Co., Inc. v. Dowling, 91 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 
1937) (same). See also Coastal Barge Corp. v. M/V Maritime Prosperity, 
901 F. Supp. 325 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (damages assessed included 
attorneys' fees and expenses, direct and derivative damages); State Bank 
& Trust Co. of Golden Meadow v. Boat "D.J. Griffin," 755 F. Supp. 1389 
(E.D. La. 1991) (attorney's fees and lost profits assessed). We have not 
encountered an award of such items as consequential damages, loss of 
reputation, or punitive damages that are available under the Dragonetti 
Act. 
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procedure and substance is notoriously difficult to draw. In 
Burlington Northern Railway Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 
(1987), the Supreme Court held that "Rules which 
incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights do not 
violate" the Rules Enabling Act if they are "reasonably 
necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules." 
480 U.S. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 
Following that rationale, the Court later emphasized that 
Rule 11 was intended to deter frivolous suits in the district 
courts. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications 
Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1991). In pursuing that 
goal, courts can impose sanctions by way of attorneys' fees 
without reallocating the burdens of litigation, as prohibited 
by the American Rule set forth in Alyeska Pipeline Service 
Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Id. 
 
Business Guides also rejected the argument that "Rule 11 
creates a federal common law of malicious prosecution." 
498 U.S. at 553. Continuing, the Court stated, "[t]he main 
objective of the Rule is not to reward parties who are 
victimized by litigation," but to deter baseless filings. Id. 
Although it conceded that sanctioning a party might benefit 
its adversary, the Court was "confident that district courts 
will resist the temptation to use sanctions as substitutes 
for tort damages," id., and noted that in the event that a 
district court misapplied the Rule in a particular case, the 
error could be corrected on appeal. Id. at 554. Business 
Guides found no need for such a correction because there, 
the district court had properly declined to include 
consequential damages in awarding attorneys' fees and out- 
of-pocket expenses. Id. 
 
In Tarkowski v. County of Lake, 775 F.2d 173, 175 (7th 
Cir. 1985), the court held that the state tort law of 
malicious abuse of process applies to federal litigation as 
well. Our experience in this field has been limited, but two 
of our opinions that we will discuss support that holding. 
 
The Bankruptcy Code provides more extensive sanctions 
than those afforded by the Rules of Civil Procedure or 27 
U.S.C. S 1927. Section 303(i)(2) of the Code permits the 
assessment of damages -- including those of a punitive 
nature -- caused by a person who files a petition for 
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involuntary bankruptcy in bad faith. 11 U.S.C. S 303(i)(2). 
Despite the broad scope of remedies available in the Code 
and the general exclusivity of the federal courts in 
bankruptcy, we have held that a state claim for malicious 
abuse of process was not preempted. Paradise Hotel Corp. 
v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47, 51-52 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
In that case, we discovered that because of a gap in the 
text the Code failed to provide a remedy against a creditor 
that had improperly filed an involuntary petition for 
bankruptcy against a debtor. We concluded that Congress 
did not intend preemption to extend to the point of barring 
a debtor from the use of a state remedy.5  Id.; see also Silver 
v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1990) (malicious filing of 
involuntary petition for bankruptcy not protected by 
judicial privilege). 
 
Our review of extant case law persuades us that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not preempt claims for 
abuse of process and similar torts providing relief for 
misconduct in federal litigation. Therefore, victims of such 
misconduct may, in appropriate circumstances, bring suit 
to recover damages under state causes of action. 
 
In a number of cases, district courts within this circuit 
have reached conflicting results on the preemption issue.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We recognize that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held 
that the Bankruptcy Code completely preempts state actions for 
malicious use of process, Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 
1987), and is thus in tension with Paradise Hotel. 
 
6. Compare Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 39 F. Supp.2d 495 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(district court whose federal question jurisdiction has been invoked 
applies federal rather than state law on abuse of process), and Thomason 
v. Lehrer, 183 F.R.D. 161 (D.N.J. 1998) (federal court is exclusive forum 
to seek redress for litigation abuses committed in a federal suit), with 
Fumo v. Gallas, 2001 WL 115460 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2001) (federal law 
does not preempt state law claims), T.B. Proprietary Corp. v. Sposato 
Builders, Inc., 1996 WL 674016 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1996) (stating that 
neither Rule 11 nor 28 U.S.C. S 1927 preempts state law cause of action 
for abuse of process), Cannon v. Sheller, 825 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Pa. 
1993) (Dragonetti Act not preempted by ERISA where action does not 
relate directly or indirectly to ERISA plan), and Plavin v. Bristol 
Borough, 
1988 WL 100814 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,1988) (recognizing that there is no 
federal tort of malicious prosecution, and state law reaches litigation 
abuses). 
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We recognize that some of these courts have relied on 
legitimate public policy concerns in concluding that the 
federal rules foreclose state claims in the nature of abuse of 
process arising out of federal litigation. We also 
acknowledge that inevitably conflicts will arise between the 
federal rules and state substantive claims. 
 
Although federal preemption would forestall such 
controversies, the precepts of federalism and the 
congressional decision to restrict the sanctions available 
within the federal system militate against such a resolution 
of the problem. As in so many other overlapping areas of 
federal and state law, we must rely on the traditional 
comity between the two systems to deal adequately and 
innovatively with such common problems. 
 
III. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, lawyers may be sued in their 
individual capacities for wrongful use of civil proceedings. 
E.g., Dietrich Indus., Inc. v. Abrams, 455 A.2d 119 (Pa. 
Super. 1982). That tort as applied in Pennsylvania 
conforms with section 674 of the Second Restatement of 
Torts. Rosenfield v. Pennsylvania Auto. Ins. Plan, 636 A.2d 
1138, 1141 (Pa. Super. 1994). The Dragonetti Act's 
definition of the tort is in agreement with that of the 
Restatement, Rosen v. American Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 
190, 192 (Pa. Super. 1993), and an attorney who knowingly 
prosecutes a groundless action to accomplish a malicious 
purpose may be held accountable under the Act. Elec. Lab. 
Supply Co. v. Cullen, 712 A.2d 304 (Pa. Super. 1998). 
 
Some distinction has been drawn between malicious use 
of process and abuse of process. Malicious use has to do 
with the wrongful initiation of civil process, as contrasted 
with abuse, which is concerned with perversion of process 
after litigation has begun. Dumont Television & Radio Corp. 
v. Franklin Elec. Co. of Phila., 154 A.2d 585, 587 (Pa. 1959). 
 
Whatever may have been the importance of that 
distinction before the Dragonetti Act was adopted, it 
appears that both torts are subsumed within the general 
scope of the Act, which includes persons who take part in 
the procurement, initiation or continuation of civil 
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proceedings for wrongful purposes. 42 Pa. C.S.A.S 8351(a). 
Liability attaches to those who act in a grossly negligent 
manner or without probable cause and primarily for a 
purpose other than adjudication of a claim. Id . In addition, 
the proceeding must have been terminated in favor of the 
person who invokes the Act. Id. S 8351(a)(2). 
 
It may be seen that a party seeking redress under 
Dragonetti bears a heavy burden. Here, it is somewhat 
questionable whether the allegedly offending procedure was 
terminated in favor of the plaintiff. Although the 
attachments have been dissolved, the District Court, as 
noted earlier, retained jurisdiction pending arbitration. 
Thus, no final judgment has been entered in favor of the 
plaintiffs. Section 674(b) of the Restatement, however, 
makes an exception from the finality rule in ex parte 
proceedings. In view of the somewhat unusual status of the 
earlier litigation and in the interests of judicial economy, we 
will assume arguendo that we may, under state law, 
proceed to the merits because the ex parte attachment 
proceedings had been terminated in favor of the plaintiffs. 
 
The plaintiffs' first contention is that seeking maritime 
attachments, despite the arbitration clause in the charter 
party, demonstrated bad faith. This argument is utterly 
lacking in merit. The Federal Arbitration Act provides that 
in admiralty actions, "the party claiming to be aggrieved 
may begin his proceeding . . . by libel and seizure of the 
vessel or other property of the other party according to the 
usual course of admiralty proceedings, and the court shall 
then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with 
the arbitration . . . ." 9 U.S.C. S 8. 
 
Indeed, so fundamental is the right to attach that the 
parties cannot consent in advance to forego that remedy. In 
The Anaconda v. American Sugar Refining Co., 322 U.S. 42, 
43 (1944), the charter party provided for arbitration but 
specifically precluded application of section 8. Nevertheless, 
the aggrieved party began legal process by foreign 
attachment. The Supreme Court held that although the 
parties had agreed to arbitrate, the attachment remedy 
could be enforced. Id. at 45-46. See also Marine Transit 
Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 275 (1932) ("By the express 
terms of S 8, the libel and seizure are authorized as an 
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initial step in a proceeding to enforce the agreement for 
arbitration . . . ."). Clearly, the defendants in this case did 
not act in bad faith by carrying out procedures authorized 
by the Federal Arbitration Act. 
 
The plaintiffs next argue that the defendants, knowing 
that Federal Rule B did apply, nevertheless secured 
the writs of attachment by improperly prevailing upon 
the District Court to follow the opinion in 
Schiffahartsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottachi S.A. 
De Navegacion, 773 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
The District Court later released the attachments, believing 
that Rule B, rather than Leonhardt, provided the controlling 
law. The plaintiffs seize on this reversal by the District 
Court of its earlier ruling as evidence of the defendants' bad 
faith in misleading the court. 
 
We cannot accept the plaintiffs' argument. The Leonhardt 
opinion was written by a distinguished judge of the 
Eleventh Circuit for an en banc court. The Court was fully 
aware of Rule B, but after reviewing the history of admiralty 
law determined that federal courts are empowered to apply 
maritime procedures as they existed at the time of the 
Constitution's adoption. Leonhardt, 773 F.2d at 1533. In 
the Court's view, Rule B was not intended to be the 
exclusive source of maritime attachments available to the 
court, nor was it intended to limit or impair the traditional 
power of the court in exercising admiralty jurisdiction. Id. 
 
The defendants' motions for issuance of a writ of 
attachment stated, "This court has the power apart from 
Rule B to issue a maritime attachment" and cited 
Leonhardt. The defendants, therefore, did not misinform the 
District Court as to the interplay between Rule B and the 
Court of Appeals opinion. In announcing the decision to 
vacate the attachments, the District Judge acknowledged, 
"The Court may have been wrong but there was no 
deception on the Court." 
 
There is a paucity of case law on this particular point, 
and it reaches the point of absurdity to contend that 
competent attorneys were guilty of bad faith in urging the 
District Court to follow this respectable authority. The fact 
that the District Court later reversed its reliance on the 
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Eleventh Circuit case and concluded that Rule B governed 
does not establish that the lawyers exercised bad judgment, 
let alone bad faith. Indeed, in a number of cases, Rule B 
has been attacked as being unconstitutional. See , e.g., 
Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 
642-45 (9th Cir. 1982) (Byrne, J., dissenting). 
 
We conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to establish 
bad faith as required under the Dragonetti Act and 
Pennsylvania common law. Accordingly, we affirm the 
District Court's dismissal of the state law claims. 
 
Having explored the background at length and concluded 
that the plaintiffs have not shown bad faith on the part of 
the defendants, we find it unnecessary to resolve the 
conflict between Leonhardt and Rule B. On the facts, the 
plaintiffs cannot recover under either version of the law. 
Consequently, we will affirm the District Court's dismissal 
of the entire case. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent because, in my view, this case 
presents no federal element sufficient to confer 28 U.S.C. 
S 1441(b) "arising under" jurisdiction. Since this case was 
improperly removed to federal court, the District Court had 
no underlying jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of 
Express Lines's action, and we are without appellate 
jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal. I would 
agree with the Ninth Circuit, which held, under similar 
circumstances, that a previously dismissed federal action 
does not cause a subsequently filed state action for 
malicious prosecution to "arise under" federal law. See Berg 
v. Leason, 32 F.3d 422 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
The majority concludes that the conflict between a federal 
procedural rule and an opinion of the Eleventh Circuit 
"raises a federal question sufficient to support removal of 
the malicious abuse of process claim from the state court 
to the federal forum." See Maj. Op. at 3. Express Lines's 
underlying state court action, however, was filed only after 
the federal action had been dismissed, and thus only after 
it was no longer necessary to resolve any conflict between 
Leonhardt and Rule B. As the majority notes, Leonhardt has 
not been overturned by the Eleventh Circuit. At best, it 
remains the jurisprudence of another circuit, and it is 
undisputed that it is simply not the law of this Circuit. To 
my knowledge, the only time Leonhardt has been invoked 
by any court in this Circuit was by the District Court in the 
underlying attachment action here. The District Court, as 
previously noted, ultimately rejected Leonhardt , and its own 
earlier reliance on it, and this decision has not been 
appealed by either party. Therefore, any purported conflict 
between Leonhardt and the Federal Rules does not present 
a sufficient federal question upon which to predicate 
jurisdiction. 
 
It is well settled that "[o]nly state-court actions that 
originally could have been filed in federal court may be 
removed to federal court by the defendant." Caterpillar Inc. 
v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. 
S 1441(a)). Additionally, we have held that the removal 
statute should be strictly construed against removal and 
that if there is any doubt as to the propriety of a removal, 
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a case should not be removed to federal court. See, e.g., 
Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 
1990); Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 
(3d Cir. 1985). 
 
In considering a motion to remand where federal question 
jurisdiction is at issue, three recognized requirements must 
be satisfied: (1) the federal question must arise from a well- 
pleaded complaint, see, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank of 
Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998); Westmoreland 
Hospital Ass'n v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania , 605 
F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1979); (2) federal law must be an 
essential element of the plaintiff 's cause of action, see, e.g., 
Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475; and (3) the federal question must be 
substantial. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. International 
College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997). I do not 
believe that any of these removal requirements were 
satisfied in this case. 
 
1. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule 
 
As the Supreme Court has held on several occasions, 
"[t]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is 
governed by the `well-pleaded complaint rule,' which 
provides that federal [question] jurisdiction exists only 
where a federal question is presented on the face of the 
plaintiff 's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc., 482 
U.S. at 392. See also American National Red Cross v. S.G. 
and A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 258 (1992); Oklahoma Tax Com'n 
v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 840-41 (1989). Thus, the 
asserted federal question must arise from a well-pleaded 
complaint, and not from the answer, the petition for 
removal, or an actual or theorized defense. Under the well- 
pleaded complaint rule, if a complaint is premised upon 
state law, federal question jurisdiction may be established 
only if "some substantial, disputed question of federal law 
is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state 
claims," or that, due to complete preemption, the plaintiff 's 
claim is "really one of federal law." See Goepel v. National 
Postal Mail Handlers Union, a Division of Luna, 36 F.3d 
306, 310 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). Also, a state case may arise under federal law 
" `where the vindication of a right under state law 
necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.' " 
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See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 
U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (quoting Franchise Tax Board v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983)). 
"[T]he vast majority of the cases brought under the general 
federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts are those 
in which federal law creates the cause of action." Id. 
 
Here, however, none of Express Lines's causes of action 
were created by federal law, and nothing in the allegations 
Express Lines presented in its complaint calls for a 
resolution of any tension between the Eleventh Circuit's 
decision in Leonhardt and the Federal Rules. As previously 
noted, no genuine conflict exists in this Circuit between 
Leonhardt and the Federal Rules. To prevail in its case, 
Express Lines needs to show only that based upon what 
Defendants knew and believed, which are factual queries, 
they proffered Leonhardt without probable cause and for a 
purpose other than obtaining the proper adjudication of 
their claim. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. S 8351 (stating that "[a] 
person who takes part in the procurement, initiation or 
continuation of civil proceedings against another is subject 
to liability to the other for wrongful use of civil proceedings, 
. . . [if h]e acts in a grossly negligent manner or without 
probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that 
of securing the proper discovery, joinder of parties or 
adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are 
based . . ."); Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598, 603-04 (3d Cir. 
1990) (finding that, under the Dragonetti Act, the 
"imposition of liability for the wrongful use of civil 
proceedings [in Pennsylvania] occurs only when litigation is 
instituted both without probable cause and primarily for a 
purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication 
of the claim in which the proceedings are based"). In other 
words, Express Lines needs to show only that Defendants 
acted either negligently or without probable cause, and 
without a proper purpose in proffering Leonhardt .1 
 
Since no genuine conflict exists between Leonhardt and 
the Federal Rules in this Circuit, any legal assertions as to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Since I do not believe we have the requisite jurisdiction to address 
this 
case on its merits, I will refrain from commenting on the strength of 
Express Lines's claims or evidence. 
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the validity of Leonhardt, if made at all, would only properly 
be made by Defendants in their Answer or in their defense. 
Neither invocation, according to the Supreme Court, is 
adequate to confer federal question jurisdiction. 
 
2. The "Essential" Element Requirement 
 
In accordance with Supreme Court jurisprudence, federal 
law must be an essential element of a plaintiff 's cause of 
action in order to confer federal subject matter jurisdiction. 
The meaning of the "essential element" requirement is best 
stated in Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 
1984): 
 
       [A court must] determine whether the federal element 
       in the claim was "basic" as opposed to "collateral," and 
       "necessary" as opposed to "merely possible." . . . . 
       Similarly, courts have looked to whether the federal 
       element in the claim was "pivotal," . . . or"substantial," 
       . . . as opposed to merely "incidental[ ]," . . . or whether 
       it was "direct and essential" as opposed to 
       "attenuated," . . . or "paramount" as opposed to 
       "collateral," . . . . Thus, the resolution of the federal 
       question must play a significant role in the 
       proceedings. 
 
Id. at 646 (internal citations omitted). Here, far from 
showing that a federal issue played a "significant role in the 
proceedings," the majority determined that it was 
"unnecessary" to resolve the issue asserted by Defendants 
as the basis for removal. See Maj. Op. at 18. That this case 
may be decided without resolving any alleged tension 
between Leonhardt and Rule B severely undermines the 
idea that this issue was essential to evaluating plaintiff 's 
claims. The majority correctly states that a federal issue 
sufficiently essential to invoke federal jurisdiction must be 
"genuine and present, [and] not merely . . . conjectural." 
See id. at 7 (citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813-14 & n.11). 
Yet, it is difficult to understand how an issue could be any 
more conjectural or any less essential than one whose 
disposition is explicitly deemed "unnecessary." 
 
3. The "Substantial" Federal Question Requirement 
 
As the majority notes, the federal law present in a 
properly removed case "must be in the forefront of the case 
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and not collateral, peripheral, or remote." Yet from the 
outset, Express Lines's case was clearly comprised solely of 
state law claims, and the majority's ability to resolve this 
case without addressing the purported federal issue only 
highlights the fact that any federal issue in this case is 
"collateral, peripheral, or remote." 
 
Further, in Merrell Dow, the Supreme Court held that no 
substantial federal question existed where the plaintiff 
alleged a violation of a federal statute as an element of a 
state cause of action. The Court explained that"[we have] 
sometimes found that formally federal causes of action were 
not properly brought under federal-question jurisdiction 
because of the overwhelming predominance of state-law 
issues." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n. 12. Invoking an 
earlier ruling, the Court noted that "the violation of the 
federal standard as an element of state tort recovery did not 
fundamentally change the state tort nature of the action." 
Id. (citing Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291 U.S. 
205, 216-17 (1934)). The Court also noted that "S 1331 
[federal question] decisions can best be understood as an 
evaluation of the nature of the federal interest at stake." Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
 
Here, as in Merrell Dow, the state law nature of Express 
Lines's claims is fundamentally unchanged by the asserted 
tension between Leonhardt and the Federal Rules. There is 
also little, if any, cognizable federal interest in having a 
federal court in our Circuit assess the legitimacy of an 
Eleventh Circuit case whose viability is not an open issue 
anywhere in this Circuit. 
 
Following the guidance of Merrell Dow, the Ninth Circuit 
has held in a case very similar to ours that an underlying 
prior federal action does not render a fundamentally state 
law action cognizable in federal court. In Berg , the plaintiff 
brought a malicious prosecution action in state court after 
successfully defending himself in a federal court proceeding 
in which he was accused of violating federal securities and 
racketeering laws. The defendant removed to federal court, 
and the District Court denied the plaintiff 's Motion to 
Remand. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that "the federal 
element is insufficiently substantial to confer`arising under' 
jurisdiction because the malicious prosecution court need 
 
                                23 
  
only decide whether the underlying claim was `legally 
tenable[;]' the cause of action is created by state law, and 
state law controls the standard by which the strength of the 
federal claim in the underlying action is measured." Berg, 
132 F.3d at 423. The Ninth Circuit elaborated that"federal 
law cannot be controlling when the degree of substance in 
the federal claim necessary to trigger the state-law cause of 
action is a question of state law." Id. at 425. Ultimately, 
then, "federal law is not dispositive because the degree of 
strength required to put the underlying claim over the 
probable cause threshold is determined by state law." Id. 
The same conclusion applies here. 
 
In examining the state law elements of the plaintiff 's 
claim, the Ninth Circuit noted that, far from the case 
requiring a legal resolution of federal questions,"[a] 
factfinder must determine what the defendant knew or 
believed about the facts." Id. Similarly, here, the subjective 
beliefs, purpose, and purported bad faith of the Defendants 
are at issue, and "the court looks at the merits of a claim 
for malicious prosecution through the prism of state law." 
Id. 
 
This case only asks whether Defendants' underlying 
claim, that Leonhardt could trump the Federal Rules, was 
legally viable enough to have been asserted legitimately and 
not in contravention of the Dragonetti Act. Express Lines's 
case presents no real or substantial question of federal law 
that compels resolution in a federal court. Rather, their 
case was, from the outset, a state case that was properly 
brought in state court originally. 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, I would find that this 
case was improperly removed to federal court, that the 
District Court had no underlying jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the merits of Express Lines's claim, and that we are thus 
without appellate jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. I 
respectfully dissent. 
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